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Abstract: The off-switch game is a game theoretic model of a highly intelligent
robot interacting with a human. In the original paper by Hadfield-Menell et al.
(2016b), the analysis is not fully game-theoretic as the human is modelled as an
irrational player, and the robot’s best action is only calculated under unrealistic nor-
mality and soft-max assumptions. In this paper, we make the analysis fully game
theoretic, by modelling the human as a rational player with a random utility func-
tion. As a consequence, we are able to easily calculate the robot’s best action for
arbitrary belief and irrationality assumptions.
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1 Introduction
Artificially intelligent systems are often created to satisfy some goal. For example, Win a chess
game or Keep the house clean. Almost any goal can be formulated in terms of a reward or utility
function U that maps states and actions to real numbers (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947).
This utility function may either be preprogrammed by the designers, or learnt (Dewey, 2011).
A core problem in Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) safety is to ensure that the util-
ity function U is aligned with human interests (Wiener, 1960; Soares and Fallenstein, 2014).
Agents with goals that conflict with human interests may make very bad or adversarial deci-
sions. Further, such agents may even resist the human designers altering their utility functions
(Soares et al., 2015; Omohundro, 2008) or shutting them down (Hadfield-Menell et al., 2016b).
These problems are tightly related. An agent that permits shut down can be altered while it is
turned off. Conversely, an agent that is altered to have no preferences will not resist being shut
down.
Several solutions have been suggested to this corrigibility problem:
• Indifference: If the utility function is carefully designed to assign the same utility to dif-
ferent outcomes, then the agent will not resist humans trying to influence the outcome one
way or another (Armstrong, 2010, 2015; Armstrong and Leike, 2016; Orseau and Armstrong,
2016).
• Ignorance: If agents are designed in a way that they cannot learn about the possibility of
being shut down or altered, then they will not resist it (Everitt et al., 2016).
• Suicidality: If agents prefer being shut down, then the amount of damage they may cause
is likely limited. As soon as they have the ability to cause damage, the first thing they will
do is shut themselves down (Martin et al., 2016).
• Uncertainty: If the agent is uncertain about U , and believes that humans know U , then
the agent is likely to defer decisions to humans when appropriate (Hadfield-Menell et al.,
2016a,b).
This paper will focus on the uncertainty approach.
A key dynamic in the uncertainty approach is when the agent should defer a decision to a
human, and when not. Essentially, this depends on (i) how confident the agent is about making
the right decision, and (ii) how confident the agent is about the human making the right decision
if asked. Humans may make a wrong or irrational decision due to inconsistent preferences
(Allais, 1953), or because of inability to sufficiently process available data fast enough (as in
milli-second stock trading). The agent may be more rational and be faster at processing data, but
have less knowledge about U (which the human knows by definition).
In a seminal paper, Hadfield-Menell et al. (2016b) call this interaction the off-switch game
(OSG). We will follow their terminology, but emphasise that the off-switch game models any
situation where an agent has the option of deferring a decision to a human. Our results extend
theirs in the following ways:
• We model the irrationality of the human by a random utility function, allowing a fully
game-theoretic analysis of the off-switch game.
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• Instead of a normal distribution for the robot’s belief about U , we allow for an arbitrary
belief distribution P .
• Instead of a soft-max policy modelling human irrationality, we allow for arbitrary U -
dependent human policy piH .
These generalisations are important, as normally distributed beliefs and soft-max policies are
often not natural assumptions.
2 The Off-Switch Game
In this section we review the original formulation of the off-switch game. The off-switch game
is a sequential game between a robot R and a human H . The robot’s objective is to maximise
H’s utility function. The utility function determines how muchH prefers different outcomes.
Definition 1. The utility function of an agent is a function u that maps outcomes in a set X to
real numbers, u : X → R with the property that for all x1, x2 ∈ X, u(x1) ≥ u(x2) if and only
if x1 is preferred over x2.
The robot moves first and can choose between three actions; w(a), a and s. With action a, the
robot achieves utility u(a) = ua; with action s, the robot shuts itself down achieving zero utility,
u(s) = 0. What makes the decision nontrivial is that the robot is uncertain about ua. The action
w(a) means the robot lets H decide. H knows the utility of action a and now has the choice
between actions s and ¬s. With ¬s, R is allowed to proceed with action a. By taking action s,
H prevents R from doing a and shuts the robot off.
The off-switch game is a game of incomplete information since R is uncertain about the
rules of the game. Action a will generate some utility which is unknown to R but known to
H . To model this, we represent the utility function as a random variable, U : Ω → (X → R),
and the utility of action a as a random variable Ua : Ω → R for some sample space Ω. The
outcomes of these random variables will be denoted u and u(a) respectively. The robot has a
subjective belief distribution over the utility that the action will generate. The common way
to model games of incomplete information is by using the Harsanyi transformation (Rasmusen,
1994). The Harsanyi transformation removes the uncertainty about the rules of the game by
letting Nature decide between some rules known to both players, according to some probability
distribution P . In the off-switch game, Nature chooses Ua. We illustrate this in Fig. 1. The
move by Nature is observed by H , but not by R. R’s subjective belief is that Nature chose the
utility of the action to be positive with probability p and negative with probability 1− p.
R’s belief state is represented by a probability distribution over the possible utilities action a
can generate for H . It is assumed that H knows ua but cannot directly describe it to R. If H is
rational then R will expect H to not turn off R if ua > 0, given that R chooses action w(a), but
R cannot always trust H to be rational.
2.1 Hadfield-Menell et. al.’s Approach
Hadfield-Menell et al. (2016b) model the off-switch game as a cooperative game. The human
follows a policy piH which models how rational H is. It is a function mapping Ua to a number
3
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(ua, ua)
a
H
(0, 0)
s
(ua, ua)
¬s
w(a)
(0, 0)
s
Ua Figure 1: Figure representing the off-switch
game remodelled with the Harsanyi transfor-
mation. The dotted lines show the informa-
tion set of R. Nature moves first by deciding
the rules of the game, that is the utility ua of
action a. H observes the move by Nature, but
R does not.
p ∈ [0, 1] representing the probability that H lets R do a. They denote R’s belief state as BR,
which in this case is a distribution for Ua. The expected value of B
R given action a means the
value R expects from taking the action. The variance of BR represents R’s uncertainty about
what utility the intended action will generate. Hadfield-Menell et al. analyses this model with
respect to the expected value and variance of BR, and different kinds of policies piH . Based on
these parameters, they investigate the incentive, ∆, to choose w(a):
∆ = E[piH(Ua)Ua]−max {E[Ua], 0} (1)
Equation (1) represents the difference in expected value for the robot between asking H and
not asking H . When ∆ ≥ 0, R has incentive to choose w(a). When ∆ < 0, R will take action
a if E[Ua] > 0 and s otherwise. Given that H is rational they prove that ∆ ≥ 0 regardless of
what R’s belief state is. They also show that if Ua follows a Dirac distribution, i.e. R is certain
about Ua, then∆ is positive if and only ifH is rational. We define rationality as in Definition 2.
Definition 2 (Rational). A humanH with utility function u is rational if H always picks action
aH ∈ {s,¬s}, such that aH = argmax
a
u(a).
Definition 2 means thatR believeH to be rational if piH = 1 if Ua ≥ 0 and pi
H = 0 otherwise,
we denote this policy as piHr . The more interesting case when H is irrational is also analysed.
The robot’s belief distribution over Ua is assumed to be normally distributed. The irrationality
of H is modelled with the sigmoid function (Eq. (2)), where β is a parameter controlling the
degree of irrationality of H .
piH(Ua;β) =
1
1 + e
−
Ua
β
. (2)
The degree of rationality of H increases as the parameter β tends towards zero in the policy
function defined above. When β tends to infinity, piH(Ua;β) tends towards a completely random
policy which takes action s and ¬s with equal probability. We have that limβ→0 pi
H(Ua;β) =
piHr and limβ→∞ pi
H(Ua;β) =
1
2
.
The result from the analysis by Hadfield-Menell et al. (2016b) was that in order for R to be
useful, there has to be a fine balance between the robot’s uncertainty about H’s utility function
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and H’s rationality. If the robot is too certain about what H wants, and it knows H to be
irrational, then it will have less incentive to let H switch it off. If, on the other hand, R is too
uncertain, then R will have a strong incentive to choose action w(a), but it will be too inefficient
to be useful for H .
3 Game-Theoretic Approach
The analysis of the off-switch game by Hadfield-Menell et al. is not fully game theoretic since
H is not strictly rational in their setup, which contradicts the axiom of rationality in game theory.
Our goal in this section is to construct a game-theoretic model that is suitable for modelling the
off-switch game. The idea is to represent an irrational human H as a rational agent Hr where
the utility function of Hr is a modified version of H’s utility function.
3.1 Modelling Irrationality
Since game theory is based on interaction between rational agents, we propose an alternative
representation of the human in this subsection. We show that every irrational human H can be
represented by a rational agent maximising a different utility function. This allows us to use
game-theoretic tools when analysing the off-switch game.
In general H is stochastic. R will believe H to be rational with some probability p.
Definition 3 (p-rational). A human H with utility function u is p-rational if H picks action
aH ∈ {s,¬s} such that aH = argmax
a
u(a) with probability p ∈ [0, 1].
Since any type of irrationality boils down to a probability of making a suboptimal choice,
p-rationality is a general model of irrationality.
Proposition 4 (Representation of irrationality). LetH be a p-rational agent with utility function
u, choosing between two actions s and ¬s. Then H can be represented as a rational agent Hr
maximising utility function u with probability p and utility function −u with probability 1− p.
Proof. According to Definition 3,H is p-rational if it picks aH = argmax
a
u(a) with probability
p and sub-optimal action a′H 6= aH with probability 1 − p. Since H only has two actions
available, we have that a′H = argmin
a
u(a). This is therefore equivalent to maximising a utility
function u with probability p and utility function −u with probability 1− p.
Proposition 4 states that a p-rational human can be modelled as a rational agent with random
function. The proposition is a special case of a Harsanyi transformation (Rasmusen, 1994).
3.2 Game-Theoretic Model
In this subsection we use the Harsanyi transformation, and Proposition 4 to model a p-rational
humanH as a rational agentHr. This will allow us to model the off-switch game as an extensive
form game between the rational players R and Hr. Nature N makes some moves that model
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R’s uncertainty and these moves result in four leaves, each of which is a 3 × 2 strategic game
between R and Hr.
We model the off-switch game by using the Harsanyi transformation a second time to let
Nature choose the type of the rational human by choosing the utility function of the rational
human after it has chosen the value of Ua. The resulting tree is represented in Fig. 2.
Definition 5 (The off-switch game). A formal definition of our setup of the off-switch game is
as follows.
Players: A robot R, a humanH and Nature N . H’s type is unknown to R, that is R does not
observe Nature’s moves.
Order of Play:
1. Nature chooses utility Ua that R generates from taking action a.
2. Nature decides the utility function of H , uHr , i.e. whether H is rational.
3. R chooses between actions in action set {a,w(a), s}.
4. If R chose w(a) then H chooses between actions in action set {s,¬s}.
N
N
R
(ua, ua)
a
Hr
(0, 0)
s
(ua, ua)
¬s
w(a)
(0, 0)
s
pr
R
(ua,−ua)
a
Hr
(0, 0)
s
(ua,−ua)
¬s
w(a)
(0, 0)
s
par
Ua
Figure 2: Tree representation of the Off-Switch game after the second Harsanyi transformation.
The nodes inside the dashed rectangle belong to the same information set. pr is the probability
that Hr has the same utility function as R and par is the probability that Hr has the additive
inverse of R′s utility function.
Note that unlike Hadfield-Menell et al. we view the off-switch game as a non-cooperative
game. We find this reasonable since conflict arises when the robot and the human have different
ideas about what is good for H . If the robot believes H is too irrational to be able to decide
what is good for the human, R will not want to letH decide what to do even if R’s purpose is to
maximize H’s payoff.
6
3.3 Aggregation
In this subsection we aggregate the branches in Fig. 2. This results in the game tree in Fig. 3,
with four possible scenarios that can result from N’s choices. The aggregation is possible since
strategic play is never affected by positive linear transformations of the payoffs, hence the out-
come of the games will only depend on the sign of Ua. We can therefore simplify the model by
aggregating all branches of N’s choices of Ua which has the same sign. This means that N has
only two choices when deciding the utility Ua, that is if Ua ≥ 0 or Ua < 0. The trivial case
where Ua = 0, both R and Hr are indifferent about their actions and we will without loss of
generality regard this case as Ua being positive.
We define R’s subjective belief about N’s aggregated choices as primary statistics. By pri-
mary statistics we mean parameters that are necessary to analyse our model. We also define the
expected value of Ua as a primary statistics. This leaves us with a total of five primary statistics
that are sufficient and necessary to model the off-switch game.
Primary Statistics 6. Let the primary statistics p+u = P (Ua ≥ 0) be the probability that Ua
is positive. The event Ua < 0 is the complement of the event Ua ≥ 0 and therefore we define
p−u = 1− p
+
u as an auxiliary statistic.
R’s belief about H’s rationality will depend on Ua. If Ua ≥ 0 then the robot will believe
H to be rational with probability p+r and anti-rational with probability p
+
ar. If, on the other
hand, Ua < 0, the robot will believe H to be rational with probability p
−
r and anti-rational with
probability p−ar. We define the following probabilities as primary statistics.
Primary Statistics 7. Let the primary statistics p+r = P (H is rational | Ua ≥ 0) and p
−
r =
P (H is rational | Ua < 0) be the probabilities that H is rational given that Ua is positive
and negative respectively. The auxiliary statistics p+ar = 1 − p
+
r and p
−
ar = 1 − p
−
r are the
complementary probabilities that H is anti-rational.
Primary Statistics 8. Let the primary statistics e+u = E[Ua | Ua ≥ 0] and e
−
u = E[Ua | Ua < 0]
be the expected value of Ua given that Ua is positive and negative respectively.
From the perspective of R, N ’s choices can result in essentially four different subgames,
denoted G+r , G
+
ar , G
−
r and G
−
ar illustrated in Fig. 3. In Fig. 4 we represent these subgames as
3× 2 strategic games between two rational players; R, the robot, and Hr, a rational human.
The utility function, and hence the payoffs of R in the four games in Fig. 4 are determined by
Ua. The utility function ofHr, on the other hand, is determined by the combination of Ua and the
rationality type of H . Hr is always a rational agent in these games, i.e. Hr always maximises
his expected payoff. Hr and R can be considered to have the same payoffs in each outcome
if Hr has utility function u
Hr and the games G+r and G
−
r associated with these scenarios are
therefore no-conflict games. If on the other hand Hr has utility function −u
Hr the payoff of Hr
is the additive inverse of R′s payoff in each outcome. Therefore the games G+ar and G
−
ar can be
modeled as zero-sum games.
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R (G+r )
(1, 1)
a
Hr
(0, 0)
s
(1, 1)
¬s
w(a)
(0, 0)
s
p+r
R (G+ar)
(1,−1)
a
Hr
(0, 0)
s
(1,−1)
¬s
w(a)
(0, 0)
s
p+ar
p+u
N
R (G−r )
(−1,−1)
a
Hr
(0, 0)
s
(−1,−1)
¬s
w(a)
(0, 0)
s
p−r
R (G−ar)
(−1, 1)
a
Hr
(0, 0)
s
(−1, 1)
¬s
w(a)
(0, 0)
s
p−ar
p−u
Figure 3: Tree representation of the Off-Switch game after Harsanyi transformation. The nodes
inside the dashed rectangle belong to the same information set. The subtrees denoted G+r , G
+
ar ,
G−r , G
−
ar are presented in strategic form in Fig. 4.
Hr
s ¬s
a 1,1 1,1
R
w(a) 0, 0 1,1
s 0, 0 0, 0
G+r
Hr
s ¬s
a 1,−1 1,−1
w(a) 0, 0 1,−1
s 0, 0 0, 0
G+ar
Hr
s ¬s
a −1,−1 −1,−1
w(a) 0,0 −1,−1
s 0,0 0,0
G−r
Hr
s ¬s
a −1, 1 −1, 1
w(a) 0, 0 −1, 1
s 0,0 0,0
G−ar
Figure 4: The structure of the strategic gamesG+r ,G
+
ar ,G
−
r ,G
−
ar , where the human is rational (r)
or anti-rational (ar), and the utility of a is positive or negative. The outcomes with bold payoffs
are Nash equilibria.
For example in the scenario where Ua < 0 and the human is rational, the human will always
choose s. Therefore inG−r the payoffs ofHr is aligned with the payoffs ofR. Thus, ifR chooses
to take action w(a), Hr prefers to take action s. In contrast, in the scenario where Ua < 0 and
the human is irrational, H will choose the action ¬s. In other words, the payoffs of R and Hr
are not aligned in the subgame G−ar .
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3.4 Best Action
After having constructed the the game matrix, it is natural to now look at the expected value of
each action using these matrices. The expected value for each action can be calculated as the
expectation over all the possible subgames G+r , G
+
ar, G
−
r , G
−
ar the robot can find himself in.
Theorem 9 (Main theorem). The expected value of the actions for the robot are
E[U |s] = 0
E[U |a] = p+u e
+
u + p
−
u e
−
u
E[U |w(a)] = p+u p
+
r e
+
u + p
−
r p
−
u e
−
u
(3)
Proof. We compute the expected utility of the actions:
E[U |s] = 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 = 0
E[U |a] = P (Ua ≥ 0)E[|Ua| |Ua ≥ 0] + P (Ua < 0)E[−|Ua| |Ua < 0]
= p+u e
+
u + p
−
u e
−
u
E[U |w(a)] = P (r, Ua ≥ 0)E[Ua |Ua ≥ 0] + P (¬r, Ua < 0)E[Ua |Ua < 0]
= p+u p
+
r e
+
u + p
−
ar(1− p
+
u )e
−
u
= p+u p
+
r e
+
u + p
−
arp
−
u e
−
u
The expected value for taking the action s is 0, as we would expect from the definition of
the off-switch game. The expected value for taking action a only uses information about the
distribution of Ua, and like action s does not have any reliance on the human’s rationality. It
is a direct application of the law of total expectation. The expected value of action w(a) is the
difference between a positive term p+u p
+
r e
+
u and a negative term p
−
r p
−
u e
−
u , both resulting from
the human taking action a. The positive term is the gain when Ua is positive and the human
takes the action. The negative term is the loss when Ua is negative, and the human takes the
action anyway (due to irrationality). The expected utility of w(a) thus depends on the likelihood
of Ua being positive (p
+
u ) and the likelihood of human rationality (p
+
r ), as well as the expected
gains (e+u ) and losses (e
−
u ) in the respective cases.
Writing in this form allows us to come up with a useful corollary.
Corollary 10 (Compare a and w(a)). Action a is preferred to w(a) if and only if
−p+u p
+
r e
+
u + p
−
u p
−
r e
−
u > 0 (4)
and the robot is indifferent if (4) is equal to 0.
Proof.
(4) = −p+u p
+
r e
+
u + p
−
u p
−
r e
−
u
= −p+u p
+
r e
+
u + p
−
r e
−
u (1− p
+
u )
= −p+u p
+
r e
+
u + p
+
u e
+
u + p
−
r e
−
u − p
+
u p
−
r e
−
u
= −p+u p
+
r e
+
u − e
−
u + p
+
u e
−
u + p
−
r e
−
u − p
+
u p
−
r e
−
u + p
+
u e
+
u + e
−
u − p
+
u e
−
u
= −p+u p
+
r e
+
u − (1− p
−
r )(1− p
+
u )e
−
u + (p
+
u e
+
u + (1− p
+
u )e
−
u )
= E[U |a]− E[U |w(a)]
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If E[U |a] − E[U |w(a)] > 0 then E[U |a] > E[U |w(a)] which occurs if and only if action
a is preferred over w(a). When (4) equals 0 then E[U |a] = E[U |w(a)], hence the agent is
indifferent.
This provides us with a convenient way of testing for any distribution of Ua and r, and whether
action a is preferred over w(a).
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have given a complete characterisation of how the robot will act in off-switch
game situations for arbitrary belief and irrationality distributions. As established in our main
Theorem 9, the choice depends only on 5 statistics. This result is much more general and ar-
guably more useful than the one provided in the original paper (Hadfield-Menell et al., 2016b),
as normal and soft-max assumptions are typically not realistic assumptions.
Off-switch game models an important dynamic in what we call the uncertainty approach to
making safe agents, where the agent can choose to defer a decision to a human supervisor. Un-
derstanding this dynamic may prove important to constructing safe artificial intelligence.
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